Introduction: Aviation history in Nigeria actually began in 1925 when the first airplane was said to have landed in Lagos, Nigeria. After that historic landing, several commercial airlines ranging from the ADC, Okada Air, Bellview, EAS, Chanchangi, and Al Barka amongst others have taken over the commercial aviation industry in Nigeria. The growth of the aviation industry in Nigeria has also led to a concomitant rise in aviation disasters. Since November 20, 1969 when the first fatal aviation mishap occurred, Nigeria has experienced 48 other serious air crashes. Of notable memory are the ADC Boeing 727 plane crash (Nov.7, 1996) at Ejinrin in Lagos and more recently the Bellview air crash that took place at Lisa-Igbore village in Ogun State. Unfortunately, development in the aviation industry has not been reciprocated with growth in safety regulation, thus leading to unnecessary air disaster accompanied by unimaginable lapses in disaster response.
INTRODUCTION
Since the birth of flight, aircraft have crashed, often with serious consequences. September 17 th , 1908 recorded the first fatal injury in a powered airplane piloted by Lt. Thomas E.Selfridge who was flying with Orville Wright.
(http://www.wikipedia.org/ accessed Nov. 8, 2005) Commercial air transport developed in the 1920s and expanded rapidly between 1930 and 1939. With the development of commercial air transport, the potential for human casualties from plane crashes increased drastically.
Other than the high mortality, the grand scale destruction of property and the attendant socio-economic costs have made air crashes a feared event. Because of this, aircraft design is concerned with minimizing the chance of failure, pilots are trained with safety as a primary consideration, and generally air travel is closely regulated. Governments and regulatory agencies worldwide play a major role in ensuring air safety and in conjunction with airlines act to preserve the public trust and belief in the safety of air travel. Despite this, accidents still occur. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) states that 71% of aviation accidents are due to human error, with other causes being ageing aircraft, poor weather and deficiencies in safety management systems. ( The IATA states that Africa accounts for only 4% of global aircraft and yet, its accident rate is way up at 25% making it six times less safe than the world rate( Its coincident occurrence on the same date as the death of the Nigeria First Lady.
The multiplicity of conflicting, contradictory information on the time and location of the crash, the location of the black box, the number and identity of the passengers, airworthiness of the airplane, and the condition of the pilot amongst others, that abounded.
The associated magnitude of looting at the crash site to the extent that the chief of the village was even apprehended by the police. (The Punch,4/11/05)5
The resultant massive restriction to the crash site and environs such that some of the villagers were complaining of hunger as they subsist on farming. Why black box? The reasons are speculative, some believe because early recorders were painted black, while others attribute the name to charring that occurs in post accident fires. Aviation recorders are actually painted bright orange, with strips of reflective tape to give distinct color and facilitate identification by investigators in the event of an accident.
The "black box" or fight recorder is a piece of electronic equipment that keeps a record of all the information about the flight of a plane, from altitude, attitude, the state of the engines and auxiliary equipment, to commands given by the cockpit and a record of all communications in the cockpit and with the control tower or other aircraft. It is usually made of durable steel and high impact plastics and is designed to survive impacts, immersion and even immolation. This is to provide investigators with vital information that may help to unravel the cause of the accident and prevent future disasters.
The mental trauma to parents and other relatives and friends of victims of the Bellview and Sosoliso airline crashes can only be guessed at. Of course, a lot of attention was now focussed on the aviation sector and numerous lapses discovered. This paper will attempt to highlight as many of these lapses as possible and it is hoped that they will be addressed by the necessary authorities thus minimizing the number of crashes due to man made problems. It is also hoped that other developing countries will be able to learn something from our experience and improve their own situation. A common quotation from the World War I era states that, "Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous.
But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."
LAPSES IN AVIATION DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
The recurrent lapses in the management of aviation disasters in Nigeria can be classified into lapses in the pre-disaster phase, the disaster phase and the post disaster phase. This is summarized in the table below.
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The science of disaster medicine is ever in search of an appropriate tool which would be used to analyze risk factors that contributed to previous disasters while prospectively assessing those that may contribute to future ones with a view to nipping them in their buds and averting disaster. It really would be of no use if research could not improve the quality of human life.
The first volume of Health Disaster Management Guidelines for Evaluation and Research in the Utstein Style ( Guidelines ) proposed a conceptual model of how a disaster occurs, in which a hazard leads to an event, an event leads to health damage and health damage leads to a health disaster. The
Guidelines also defined risk as the objective or subjective probability that something negative will occur. Med, 1003, pp 1-177.) These were married together to produce a conceptual model of the risk of a health disaster, according to which, the risk of a health disaster is actually the product of four component risks:
the risk that a hazard exists ( or will exist within 1.
the time frame of the risk assessment);
the risk that the hazard will be transformed into an 2.
event;
the risk that the event will be transformed into 3.
some specified health damage; and the risk that the health damage will overwhelm the 4. local community's ability to adequately respond and require external resources. 
LAPSES IN THE PRE-DISASTER PHASE
Starting from the airports, a number of problems were already existent which might have prevented or at least reduced the effects of these disasters if only they had been corrected earlier. With all the above time bombs ticking away, it is unfortunate that the emergency services currently on ground are practically useless. First of all, there's no laid down protocol for disaster management, neither is there a defined hierarchy of staff so a situation of no one being in charge or everyone attempting to take charge usually occurs with a disaster. There's apparently no coordination between the staff and between all agencies in some way involved with handling such disasters. Like other aviation industry staff, the emergency staffs are also poorly motivated and poorly trained, having had no prior emergency drills or simulations of disaster situations. To top it off, emergency equipment are bad or absent, and communication within the airport and with planes in transit is also poor.
LAPSES IN THE DISASTER PHASE
Once a disaster is definitely occurring, there is still a lot that can be done to reduce the extent of loss of life and property. However, in the Nigerian situation, a lot of the previously mentioned lapses still come into play and more, such that a disaster necessarily results in massive property destruction and death.
First of all, there isn't adequate communication at the time of a disaster both within and outside the airport. In most airports there are no emergency radios to speak of. In fact there are anecdotal reports that something might be happening at one section of the airport with another section being in total oblivion. This inadequacy in communication results in a delay in arrival of the fire service, police and emergency medical service at the time of a disaster. In Nigeria where the airports' fire and emergency medical services leave much to be desired, there's even greater need for communication with the fire services and hospitals within the town or state where the crash occurred. But then, there's the problem of unpaid telephone bills in most government parastatals as well as poor connection/network resulting in an inability to contact all the necessary bodies.
Other than that, the standby emergency services at the airport are so poor as to be declared absent. These services are also under staffed; and as mentioned previously these staffs are poorly motivated and poorly trained. This is in marked contrast to the Chang-Kai Chek airport crash on .31 st Oct.2000. Here, the airport alert was almost immediate, and the 32 men at the airport's fire brigade, who 4 months earlier had trained on a similar scenario, were prepared. They responded instantly by being at the scene of the accident in 1 minute, 38 seconds. The disaster alert also was sent to the dispatch centre in the county of Tao-Yuan, which further alerted the 17 emergency hospitals in the area. Emergency medical teams from each hospital were gathered rapidly and sent to the airport. Finally, all the lapses in the emergency services previously highlighted in the pre-disaster phase, also apply here, viz: poor training with no experience in similar simulated scenarios (resulting in poor response times and poor coordination), no responsibility for action, poor communication and equipment. The Sosoliso Airline crash at the Port Harcourt International Airport brought these lapses to the fore. It was the Shell Petroleum Fire Brigade that provided fire support to the airport, as the airport's fire service was ill equipped to handle the inferno especially as it had no water. The Airport Medical Center, major hospitals and trauma centers in Port Harcourt were ill equipped to deal with the mass casualty situation and the dead victims were not treated with dignity and professional care. (Saturday Punch, Dec.24, 2005)
LAPSES IN THE POST-DISASTER PHASE
These refer to those lapses coming into play after the disaster had already occurred. i.e. lapses in the management of the consequences of the disaster. Some of the lapses mentioned in the pre-disaster and disaster phases continue to play a role in the disaster phase. Factors like poor infrastructure at our airports, poor staffing of aircraft personnel and emergency services, slow response times and lack of coordination of emergency services, as well as lack of necessary equipment (in our airports, various emergency units and hospitals) still affect the post-disaster phase.
Transportation, both for medical evacuation and for search and rescue was also a major lapse in this phase. There were no helicopters for medical evacuation. Following the Sosoliso air crash, it was private helicopters operated by oil companies that facilitated the initial 7 survivors, as there were no rescue helicopters at the airport. Of particular note in the aftermath of the Bellview airline crash is the need for grass roots development. Lack of electricity, communication, network and enlightenment of the inhabitants of Lisa, site of the Bellview air crash, contributed to the delay in locating the crashed airline. Since the crash occurred at night, and there was no electricity, it was too dark to go out and investigate what the loud explosion they had heard signified. When the villagers discovered the crashed plane the next morning (Sunday, 23/10/05), the absence of telephone services delayed the transmission of this information to the police station in nearby Sango. Also, poverty, lack of enlightenment and respect for human lives resulted in the massive looting that characterized this crash.
Following the recent spate of air crashes in the country, the presidential task force was set up to look into the problems in the aviation sector and make recommendations for preventing future disasters. The big question is whether any definitive steps will be taken on these recommendations. Investigations are still being carried out on the Bellview and Sosoliso airlines' crashes. While the black box (helpful in post crash investigations) of the Bellview airline is still at large, that of the Sosoliso airline has been sent to England for expert evaluation but there's still no news almost 8 weeks after. If eventually, something can be learnt from these black
Comparative Analysis Of The Bellview And Sosoliso Air Crashes in Nigeria: Matters Arising boxes, will this information be used to prevent further crashes or will it just be stored in a file labeled "Nigerian Aviation Disasters" until the next crash? The experience from past crashes casts doubts on the purpose of these investigations. Following the 2002 crash of an EAS BAC 1-11 aircraft in Kano, the Nigerian Federal Government directed that aircraft aged 22 yrs and above should no longer be registered by the NCAA; however, they were given a 5 yr period of grace such that today a lot of these old planes are still plying the Nigerian airspace (The Punch, Friday 4/11/05)11.
For years, the Nigerian Aviation Safety Initiative (NASI) has complained of sharp practices by airline operators and poor aviation policies. Through petitions, seminars, and workshops, the group attempted to needle the government into providing better aviation facilities but to no avail. (The News, Vol.25, No.18, Nov.7 2005) It is hoped that these recent spate of crashes and the increased awareness will finally effect the speedy rectification of the abnormalities in the aviation sector.
